Strategic Defence Review: DSF comment

5 June 2025

Lady Olga Maitland reflects:

‘Sir Keir Starmer’s rhetoric about putting Britain on ‘war-fighting readiness’ is welcome, but he cannot afford to delay real increases in defence spending. The current budget of 2.33% of GDP cannot possibly match his ‘wish list’.  He will be pushed by NATO and Trump toward 3% well before his 2034 target.

We are already facing surrogate warfare: cyberattacks on infrastructure, severed undersea cables, and relentless probing of our borders. In 2024 alone, the UK endured 89 nationally significant cyber incidents, while RAF Typhoons scrambled 32 times to intercept Russian aircraft. Russian ships increasingly violate our waters. The campaign to destabilise us has begun.

I do welcome the commitment to upgrading drones, cyber, lasers, and missile  capability.  But this must be matched by real investment now, not tomorrow. We should also rethink our very expensive commitment to build 12 new nuclear submarines through the AUKUS programme. European defence comes first.

Recruitment has been a disaster, having been outsourced to an incompetent agency. Applicants have been walking away after delays taking many months.’

Sir Malcolm Rifkind, former Foreign and Defence Secretary:

'The review is good in parts, but there is justified criticism between ambition and aspiration compared to commitment. The increase in spending does not go far enough. The Government is trying to prepare the country for increased defence spending resting on the belief that a Putin onslaught on the UK will not be for at least three years.  Putin is rational, not stupid, and cruel. Post the Ukraine war, he will need to to rebuild his own forces, and then will undoubtedly start destabilizing NATO, beginning with the Baltic countries under the pretext of ‘protecting’ the local 20% Russian population, who, save for a very tiny minority, want to stay where they are.’

Brigadier Ben Barry, Senior Fellow for Land Warfare at IISS:

‘Much of the SDR makes sense, but I don't see how it can be achieved with current funding levels. While the threat analysis is sound, it notably fails to give a date by which Russia could rebuild its defence capability. The same applies to the proposed defence rebuilding measures in Chapter 2, and the frank assessment of current defence readiness on pages 33-34. But all the evidence I see suggests that our readiness is even lower than this implies. And by not setting a date by which the armed forces have to be ready for war, ministers and the MoD indicate a lack of resolve and urgency to reverse hollowing out.

The example of this is in defence medical services (Section 7.10).  These are clearly unfit for war, but the proposals for them do not give me any confidence their capability will be rapidly rebuilt.  

Another example of blather is homeland defence.  It articulates  the threat quite well on page 31, but I suspect an extra £1 billion for air/missile defense will barely make a dent on the threat. It rightly notes that if the Army mobilizes to meet its full NATO commitment, there will be very few troops - resultar or reserve - left to support the resilience of the UK.  

Given that the review explicitly states that regular manpower is not to reduce, I see very little in the way of down arrows - other than the cost of future ships.

The Army is to provide a strategic reserve corps to NATO. Commanded by the existing Allied Command Operations Rapid Reaction Corps HQ (HQ ARRC), this is to comprise two divisions, enabled by “corps-level capability”. One of the divisions is to have three armoured/mechanised brigades and a support brigade. 

Current Army capabilities fall short of this, with its mechanised division having only two armoured brigades. It is also the only major NATO army without infantry fighting vehicles. Its infantry division has the air assault brigade, a light mechanised brigade and an infantry brigade, that is half made up of reserve units. The commitment to reinforce existing forces in Estonia with a brigade makes fielding a full second division currently impossible. And whilst HQ ARRC commands logistic, engineer and attack helicopter brigades, it lacks the artillery, air and defence, and intelligence and surveillance brigades that are integral to U.S. Army corps.

The Army already has an equipment modernisation plan featuring’ challenger 3 tanks, boxer APCs and medium artillery. The current Chief of the General Staff, Sir Roly Walker, has already committed the Army to double its lethality by 2027 and triple it by 2030. Measures to achieve this include greatly increased use of drones, AI and data networks. Recent field trials of this approach have been encouraging. 

But the SDR requires the Army to be “bolder in its ambition, seeking to increase lethality ten-fold”. This may, in theory, be achievable. But given the Army’s significant weaknesses, in force structure, logistic stockpiles, collective training, readiness and manning it is very difficult to see how this ambition could be achieved without a significant increase in investment in land capabilities, beyond that the government has committed to. 

There is to be a significant increase in the performance of Defence Equipment and Support, which has previously often frustrated the Army’s ability to get equipment delivered as rapidly as it needs. The review offers no credible evidence that defence procurement is getting more effective. 

So nothing convinces me this is affordable, other than if the budget immediately went up to 3%, with it rising to 3.5% in the next parliament. And what happens if the US persuades NATO to go for 3.5% at its summit?'