From Kiev to Taipei: how Russia - China alignment shapes the next flashpoint

 Defence and Security Forum Dinner on 29^th January 2026, London

Speakers: Rear Admiral (Ret’d) Mark Montgomery,

Justin Crump

Moderator: Gordon Fairclough

Presiding: Lady Olga Maitland 

Report by Emily Claessen

The world has entered something more corrosive than the Cold War: a time of permanent pressure, where conflict is continuous and deliberately ambiguous.

Russia now commits around 40 percent of its federal budget to defence and war-related spending - a level unseen in Europe since the mid-20th century. It fields roughly 400,000 new troops per year, accepting casualty rates that would be politically unsustainable in most democracies. By conservative estimates, 150,000 to 200,000 of those troops are killed or seriously wounded annually. The war continues anyway.

Ukraine as a Testbed

Ukraine is not only a battlefield; it is a laboratory. The key lesson is how quickly they adjust. Drone designs now cycle in 60 to 90 days, and software updates occur in days, not years. Tactics evolve between rotations, not between wars.

By contrast, Western weapons systems still require 18 to 20 months for testing and certification. In one case, a locally produced counter-drone system in Ukraine was conceived, built, and tested in under 18 hours. The same process would take Western militaries years.

External Enablers

Russia’s ability to sustain this conflict rests on external enablers. North Korea has supplied 5 to 6 millions of artillery rounds to Russia - more than some NATO states have produced in a decade. Iran provided early generations of drones; Russia now manufactures improved versions domestically.

But the decisive support is economic: nearly half of Russia’s export revenue comes from fossil fuel sales, with China representing Russia’s largest export market. Without this outlet, Moscow would be forced to choose: fund the war or fund domestic stability. So far, it has avoided that choice entirely.

Pressure Without Invasion

Elsewhere, the lesson drawn is different. Open war is costly, slow, and unpredictable.

Consider Taiwan. The island imports nearly 100 percent of its energy - roughly 50 percent LNG and 40 percent coal. It maintains approximately 12 days of LNG storage. One LNG carrier arrives per day.

If you interrupt a dozen shipments, national power generation drops by half. The choice is immediate: hospitals and homes, or semiconductor fabrication? Industry leaders estimate the shutdown of advanced chip production would trigger USD 1–2 trillion in global economic losses within weeks. No invasion required, and no missiles fired; just quiet, deniable pressure.

Europe’s Grey-Zone

Europe, meanwhile, faces a surge in non-kinetic attacks. Sabotage, cyber intrusions, influence campaigns, and weaponised migration incidents have increased significantly over the past two years. In some regions, incidents are estimated to be ten to twelve times higher than pre-2022 baselines.

These actions rarely trigger collective defence mechanisms. But that is the point : they aim to exhaust public attention, fragment political consensus, and normalise vulnerability.

Defence spending is rising, but from a low base. Many European states allowed defence budgets to fall from 4–5 percent of GDP during the Cold War to around 1.5 percent by the late 2010s. Rebuilding capability after a 30-year holiday is neither quick nor cheap.

The Alliance Stress Test

Alliances built for deterrence by punishment now face deterrence by resilience. That requires stockpiles, industrial depth, political consistency, and societal preparedness.

Yet Western munitions inventories entered the Ukraine war at roughly 30 percent of required wartime levels, the result of decades of optimistic planning and budgetary trimming. Production is increasing, but slowly, and in some cases, stockpiles are being used faster than they are replenished.

A Lingering Shift

This is not a prelude to world war. It is something more unstable: a prolonged transition in which old rules no longer constrain behaviour. History suggests such periods are the most dangerous. Not because conflict is inevitable, but because miscalculation is cheap until it is not.

The defining question is therefore not whether war will break out tomorrow, but whether democratic societies can build and sustain the resilience needed to maintain attention, investment, and coherence in a world where conflict is constant and designed to be ignored.