"If Russia Wins: A Scenario"

Defence and Security Forum Symposium Dinner

in co-operation with Konrad Adenauer Stiftung

Speaker: Professor Dr. Carlo Masala

Moderator: Rt Hon. Sir Malcolm Rifkind, KCMG, KC

Presiding: Dr Canan Atilgan, Lady Olga Maitland

8^th September 2025, London

Report by Emily Claessen

When Putin ordered the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, he promised a swift campaign. More than three years later, Russia still controls just 18% of Ukraine’s territory. It has failed to topple Kyiv, failed to subdue Ukraine’s army, and failed to extinguish the will of its people. Despite this, the West cannot afford complacency. For all its failures, Moscow retains a proven talent for exploiting weakness abroad.

Professor Carlo Masala’s book, If Russia Wins, published this year, tackles that question with unsettling precision. It presents a fictionalised scenario beginning with a peace deal in Geneva that effectively cements Russian territorial gains and leaves Ukraine politically fractured. From there, the scenario unfolds into a story that is less prophecy than warning.

The Geneva “Peace”

The scenario begins in 2028, after years of attrition have sapped Ukraine’s strength and eroded Western resolve. Ukraine, exhausted and diplomatically isolated, accepts a settlement that hands Moscow control of occupied territory and opens the way for Russian manipulation of Ukrainian politics. A wave of refugees heads west, destabilising Poland and Germany. Far-right parties, riding resentment at the billions spent on Ukraine, surge in popularity.

Narva, 2028

The Kremlin’s strategists would never risk a frontal assault on Poland or the Baltic states. Instead, they would seek a “soft underbelly” - a target limited enough to splinter NATO unity, but provocative enough to test Article 5. The fictional attack falls on Narva, an Estonian city of 50,000 where 88% of residents speak Russian and many hold Russian passports.

The playbook is familiar: claims of minority oppression, “little green men” stirring unrest, and suddenly, Russian brigades crossing the border. Within days, Narva is occupied. Simultaneously, Russian forces seize the Estonian island of Hiiumaa, threatening NATO control of the Baltic Sea. Moscow insists its ambitions go no further than “protecting Russian speakers”. The move recalls an old Cold War dilemma: would the United States risk New York for Narva?

Distraction and Division

What makes the scenario plausible is not Russian strength but Western distraction. In the scenario, Moscow pressures its Chinese ally to escalate tensions in the South China Sea, forcing the US Navy to divert carrier groups. At the same time, Russia engineers a migrant crisis across the Mediterranean, consuming European attention. NATO, suddenly forced to choose between escalation and inaction, hesitates. In the scenario, allies debate invoking Article 5. Some demand immediate negotiations. Others, led by the Baltics and Poland, insist on military action while the rest hesitate – has article 5 already failed?

Limits of Power

After years of grinding war in Ukraine, Russia’s military has proved far less formidable than many feared. Any attempt to strike NATO would be suicidal - pitting Moscow against not only Europe but also the United States, a far cry from 1939 when Hitler gambled against a divided continent.

Moreover, NATO has not stood still. Finland and Sweden’s accession transformed the Baltic Sea into what some call a “NATO lake”. Forward-deployed battalions already sit in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Reinforcements could fly in within hours.

Nevertheless, defence debates in capitals revolve too often around what to buy, not how to mobilise industry and society when it matters. Europe’s defence industries remain largely twentieth-century structures, geared for bespoke peacetime projects, not mass twenty-first-century wartime output. The result is a gap between strategic intent and practical capacity. Stockpiles of ammunition, guided munitions, and air-defence interceptors have been drawn down. Governments make pledges, but scaling up production takes years. By 2029, Russia could be ready to menace its neighbours again. Europe may not be.

Resilience

Deterrence is not simply about materiel: it is 40% hardware, and 70% psychological. Russia does not need to defeat NATO outright; it needs only to sow doubt in its unity. A fractured response, even to a limited incursion, could unravel the alliance’s credibility - a victory for Moscow without firing beyond Narva’s city limits. If NATO members waver, if publics demand “peace” at any price, deterrence collapses before a shot is fired.

Ultimately, the decisive factor will not be tanks or drones but resilience - the willingness of Western societies to bear costs. Russia already bets on exhaustion: soaring energy prices, political polarisation, and war fatigue. The longer the conflict drags on, the more tempting it becomes for Berlin, Paris, or Washington to accept a “frozen peace” on Moscow’s terms. The danger, then, is not only that Russia might seize Narva or test Article 5, but that Western societies might let it happen.

Scandinavian and Baltic states have already cultivated readiness through civil preparedness, decentralised services, and public expectations of sacrifice - households keep emergency supplies, and citizens are trained for contingencies. In contrast, three days without power in many German and British cities would leave residents helpless.

The Cyber and Hybrid Front

 Last year alone, European systems faced 90,000 cyberattacks traced to Russian sources. Social media platforms, flooded with disinformation, have become both weapons and battlefields. Cyber operations and information warfare are not preludes but central pillars of Moscow’s strategy designed to undermine NATO unity long before tanks cross a border. And if there is one area where Europe already punches above its weight, it is cryptography and cyber expertise. Harnessing that talent is crucial.

For all the talk of European “strategic autonomy", Washington’s surveillance and cyber capabilities remain the alliance’s nervous system, and without them, Europe could be blind to the hybrid campaigns already underway.

More Than Ukraine

The war in Ukraine is not a local struggle but a hinge of the international order. Whether Moscow prevails will shape not just Europe’s future but the balance of power between democracies and autocracies in the 21st century. Russia’s entente with China and North Korea has also opened a new dynamic: Beijing provides economic lifelines and diplomatic cover; Pyongyang supplies shells. In return, Moscow ties down Western attention in Europe while China presses its claims in Asia. For both, the game is not just Ukraine but the architecture of global power.

That, ultimately, is Professor Masala’s point. Fictional though it is, the tale is a warning that deterrence requires weapons, but above all it requires will - to absorb cyber strikes, to endure economic pain, and to face down the creeping politics of fear.

Resilience is the true centre of gravity. Without it, NATO becomes a house of cards: elaborate on paper, fragile in practice. If Europe does not answer the “how” - how to mobilise factories, how to harden societies, how to keep democracies resilient under prolonged hybrid pressure - then Russia need not conquer Kyiv again to achieve decisive strategic gains. It will have already won.