European Security at a Crossroads as Russia advances

A Defence and Security Forum report by Emily Claessen following our recent dinner with keynote speaker Lt General Ben Hodges and moderator Lord Dannatt, GCB, CBE, MC, DL, and with Lady Olga Maitland presiding.

Three years after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the West is being tested in ways it hasn’t seen for decades. The U.S. is stepping back, tied up in politics and budget pressures, while European countries face new threats, from cyberattacks to disruptions in energy, that put their security to the test. Europe can’t rely on Washington alone; it needs to assess its own willingness and ability to defend itself.

When America’s Commitment Falters

In the United States, the longstanding bipartisan consensus on NATO and global leadership has weakened amid domestic divisions, fiscal pressures, and strategic exhaustion. The current administration, facing a divided Congress and looming fiscal constraints, has emphasised “homeland defence” while trimming deployments abroad.

Approximately 90,000 American troops remain stationed in Europe, but projections indicate a reduction in the coming years. Of greater concern to allies is Washington’s ambiguous stance on Ukraine: the U.S. has provided sufficient support to prevent Kyiv’s collapse but has stopped short of enabling a decisive victory. The result is a protracted war of attrition that drains Ukraine and tests the resolve of its Western backers.

The Defence Debate

For the first time since the Cold War, Europe’s security discourse has taken on an existential tone. Russian drones have violated Polish airspace; undersea communication cables have been severed; and cyberattacks have disrupted critical infrastructure, including airports and hospitals, from Munich to Copenhagen. These incidents are not isolated, but part of a deliberate “grey zone” strategy designed to undermine cohesion without provoking open conflict.

Germany, historically reluctant to embrace military power, now invokes the concept of Kriegstüchtigkeit - war readiness. In the United Kingdom, budgetary constraints limit strategic initiatives. It is becoming increasingly clear that safety depends on effective deterrence.

Deterring Without Washington

In theory, Europe possesses the resources to compensate for a diminished U.S. involvement. The combined economic and industrial capacity of the European Union, the United Kingdom, and Norway far exceeds that of Russia. The deficit lies not in capability but in political will and strategic coherence. Effective deterrence requires more than equipment - it demands a shared conviction that the European way of life merits defence.

Having long delegated both security and strategic vision to the United States, Europe must now relearn the discipline of readiness. This entails large-scale rearmament, the revival of defence industries optimised for peacetime, and a candid public conversation about the costs of security. The most effective means of preventing war is to demonstrate credible preparedness to wage it.

A viable European strategy would rest on five pillars:

First, societies must be told the truth. Leaders must speak to their citizens as adults, explaining what is at stake and what failure would cost. Pretending that peace is the default condition of European life is a fatal lie.

Second, Ukraine must win. That victory would be the most cost-effective defence investment in European history. Every kilometre of ground the Ukrainians hold spares Europe the need to fight for it later. And the financial cost remains trivial compared with the cost of a wider war.

Third, Europe must dismantle Russia’s war machine at its source: its oil and gas exports. Russia survives on fossil revenues funnelled through a fleet of “shadow tankers” that carry sanctioned crude through the Baltic every day. Disrupting these would be key.

Fourth, the continent must rediscover the meaning of readiness. This is not just about buying new weapons, it is about trained people, functioning logistics, and the capacity to “fight tonight”.

Fifth, industry must move to a wartime footing. We have to operate and innovate at a wartime pace - yet procurement remains painfully slow and risk-averse. Ammunition factories are idle while parliaments debate procurement reform.

The Persistent Threat of Russia

Putin’s expansionist agenda remains the central driver of European insecurity. His objective is not border defence but the dismantlement of the post-Cold War order. If Ukraine is defeated, Russia’s next offensive would not begin with tanks rolling into NATO territory, it would begin with strikes on the arteries of Europe’s survival: energy networks, transport hubs, ports, and data cables. Each instance of Western hesitation reinforces Putin’s calculation that liberal democracies lack the cohesion and resolve to resist sustained pressure.

Russia’s military campaign, though marked by corruption, logistical failures, and heavy losses, has nevertheless succeeded in its strategy of exhaustion: eroding Ukraine’s strength while fracturing Western unity. Should Ukraine lose, the repercussions would extend far beyond its borders. A victorious and rearmed Russia would likely probe NATO’s credibility in the Baltic states or elsewhere.

The Expanding Cyber Domain

The modern battlefield extends into cyberspace, maritime routes, and public perception. Russian cyber operations now target not only state institutions but civilian infrastructure such as hospitals, ports, and information networks. What originated as intelligence gathering has evolved into systematic sabotage.

Russian intelligence services are recruiting European teenagers, some as young as 14, through gaming platforms to hack Western networks. The West’s vulnerability stems not only from technological exposure but also from a foundational assumption that cyberspace is a neutral domain rather than a contested one.

The Psychology of Complacency

Europe’s greatest vulnerability may be psychological. Three generations of peace have fostered the belief that security is an entitlement rather than a condition requiring active maintenance. Defence has been reduced to a budgetary line item rather than a collective responsibility. The prospect of fighting for national survival strikes many as obsolete, even distasteful.

Yet historical patterns have reasserted themselves. Complacency has supplanted vigilance; denial has replaced deterrence. The notion that nuclear arsenals alone ensure peace is misguided - deterrence hinges on credibility.

The Test of Will

Ultimately, Europe’s challenge is moral rather than material. The continent commands vast resources, industrial capacity, and human capital. What it lacks is unified conviction. Europe needs to be ready to speak frankly about responsibility and capability, and how to translate threat to generations that haven’t experienced war.

History shows how quickly moral clarity can transform into material resolve: in 1935, Britain allocated less than 3 percent of GDP to defence; by 1940, the figure had risen to 46 percent. The cost of preparedness is steep, but the price of complacency is something Europe cannot afford.

The Imperative of Readiness

Europe is already under sustained assault - through disinformation, cyber operations, and the erosion of public trust – but its prospects improve the sooner it acknowledges that Russia is already at war with the West. We treated stability as a given, not a condition that has to be defended. Whether the West acknowledges this reality or continues to live in denial will shape the future of the order it once believed secure.